We report an extension of the procedure devised by Weinstein and Shanks (2008) to study false recognition and priming of pictures. Participants viewed scenes with multiple embedded objects (seen items), then studied the names of these objects and the names of other objects (read items).
FALSE RECOGNITION TESTED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY
participants as a seen item, a read item, and a new item. In each of these counterbalancing versions, 7 of the 9 objects remained constant (these were fillers); the remaining 2 objects differed between versions.
Each participant saw all ten scenes during the study phase of the experiment, but only one version of each scene. Therefore, participants saw 20 critical items during the study phase (i.e., 2 items x 10 scenes). A further 20 critical items appeared as words in the false memory induction phase described shortly. A final 20 items did not appear until the test phase. The test phase consisted of all 60 critical items.
Procedure. The experiment comprised three phases: The study phase in which participants viewed scenes; the false memory induction phase in which participants studied the names of objects; and the test phase in which participants identified object pictures and indicated whether they recognized each object.
Study Phase. During encoding, participants studied ten scenes (each containing nine items) for 15 sec each. Participants were told that each scene would appear on the screen for 15 seconds, and that the next scene would appear automatically. They were told to study each scene carefully while it was on the screen, and to try to take in every object in the scene. A 5-min distractor task followed, during which participants performed multiplication problems.
False memory induction Phase. Participants were next told that they would be studying the names of objects they had seen in the scenes. Seventy words appeared sequentially on the screen for 4 sec each, and as an orientation task to ensure encoding, participants were asked to indicate the number of vowels in each word presented. In Weinstein and Shanks (2008, Experiment 4) , very shallow processing of object words was sufficient to induce false FALSE RECOGNITION TESTED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY recognition of pictures of those objects. Thus, we expected that vowel-counting would similarly elicit false recognition.
Only 50 of the 70 words presented actually referred to objects that had appeared in the scenes, of which 20 were our critical "seen items" and 30 were fillers. The remaining 20 words referred to objects that had not appeared in the scenes, hereafter referred to as "read items". To make room for the 20 read items, the names of 20 objects that did appear in the scenes were removed from the list; the same 20 words were removed for all participants. Participants made responses by pressing the numerical key corresponding to the number of vowels in each word.
Test Phase. Immediately after the false memory induction phase, participants were presented with pictures of the 60 critical objects sequentially, in a random order. Pictures of seen, imagined, and new objects were each presented in a 300 x 300 pixel square with a white background. The test combined both identification (indirect) and recognition (direct) components. On each trial, participants first attempted to identify a picture as it flashed briefly on the screen. The picture would appear repeatedly, followed immediately by a mask image (see Weinstein & Shanks, 2008, Figure 1 ). Each time the picture appeared, it remained on the screen for a slightly longer duration whereas the mask followed for a shorter duration; each 'picturemask' presentation cycle spanned 250 ms. On the first cycle, the picture appeared for 16.7 ms (and the mask for 233.3 ms) and this duration increased by 16.7 ms on each presentation, for a total of 14 sequences (3500 ms in total). Participants pressed 'Enter' once they thought they could identify the object pictured, at which point the picture disappeared, RT was recorded, and participants typed the object's name. After this identification-or after 3500 ms, if participants did not press 'Enter'-participants were again shown the object picture on the screen, and asked to indicate without time limit whether the picture was "old" (i.e., it was presented in the Study FALSE RECOGNITION TESTED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY Phase) or "new" (i.e., it was not presented in the Study Phase). Responses were made on a 6-point scale from 1 = very sure new to 6 = very sure old. This combined identification and recognition judgment process was repeated for each of the 60 test items.
Results
In the following analysis we first examine whether recognition and identification RT data in our scene paradigm replicate Weinstein and Shanks (2008) , who presented objects in isolation.
We then test our prediction of priming on falsely recognized objects (i.e., pictures incorrectly called 'old'). All analyses are significant to p < .05 unless otherwise stated.
Recognition. Following Weinstein and Shanks, responses made on the 6-point scale were classified as "old" or "new" by binning responses 4-6 and 1-3 respectively. The first row of identification (exclusion criterion [1] above), participants had to produce an object name that was sufficiently similar to the depicted object, with misspellings and variants (e.g., "dictionary" instead of "book) accepted as correct. These three exclusion criteria resulted in the exclusion of 3.7% of data-points. In the analyses of identification data that follow, we calculated each participant's median RT for each cell of the experimental design; descriptive and inferential statistics are therefore based on the means of these individual participant by condition medians (i.e., the medians averaged across participants). The first row of Table 2 shows RT data for each item type, and a repeated-measures ANOVA on these data was significant, F(2, 58) = 7.23, η p 2 =
.20. Paired-sample t-tests showed that seen items (M = 1320 ms, SD = 242) were identified faster 
Identification RTs for falsely recognized pictures. Our indirect test results so far
replicate those of Weinstein and Shanks (2008) , and suggest that studying the name of an object promoted false recognition but did not prime identification. However, as we outlined above, it is possible that we might only detect a significant priming effect when we focus solely on the RT data for items that were judged (correctly or incorrectly) to be 'old'.
We therefore conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on participants' RT data for pictures they called 'old'. We excluded the data of 1 participant who did not respond 'old' to at least one picture of each item type (this participant did not respond 'old' to any read items). An alternative explanation of these findings depends not on the presence of a particular type of memory, but on the mental availability of object-words. According to this interpretation, RTs for read items might be faster not because of any visual memory representation for those items, but because seeing an object's name makes that name come to participants' minds more readily when the object is shown later on. This is a reasonable account, but one that does not seem to fit with our data. If this account were correct, then we should expect to see read items being identified faster than new items irrespective of whether they were called 'old' or 'new'.
However, this was not the case: There were no systematic differences in identification RTs for response for each of the three item types (all four of these participants did not respond 'new' to any of the seen items). We also repeated the analysis for items called 'old' on this reduced sample (n = 26), and found the same results to those reported above (for the n = 29 sample) 1 . FALSE RECOGNITION TESTED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY phase, i.e., 8 objects x 6 scenes (seen items); 48 items appeared as words in the false memory induction phase (read items); and 48 did not appear until the test phase (new items). The test phase consisted of all 144 items. The three phases were otherwise identical to Experiment 1 except that the distractor task following the study phase was reduced to 2 min.
Results
Recognition. As in Experiment 1, responses made on the 6-point scale were classified as "old" or "new" by binning responses 4-6 and 1-3 respectively. The second row of Table 1 presents the proportion of each item type judged to be "old", and a repeated-measures ANOVA on these data revealed a significant main effect of item type, F(1.27, 67.5) = 397.7, η p 2 = .88. Identification. Before examining participants' RT data, we excluded data-points using the same criteria as in Experiment 1. This excluded 4.5% of data-points. The second row of objects, their identification of these items was significantly faster if they had encountered the object-word than if they had not. However, unlike in Experiment 1, identification RTs for seen items correctly called 'old' were significantly faster than were the RTs for falsely identified read items, t(38) = 3.37, d = 0.31. Again, there was no evidence that the identification priming for read items was driven by word availability rather than memory: there were no systematic RT 
Discussion
In two experiments, we showed that a simple procedure involving shallow (largely lexical) processing of object words promoted false recognition of pictures. More importantly, our indirect test data showed that the false recognition induced by this procedure was accompanied by priming. Indirect memory tests represent one way of comparing the phenomenology of true and false memories, and our data resonate with those of studies that used direct measures-such as introspective reports (Heaps & Nash, 2001 ) and source attributions of perceptual features (Lyle & Johnson, 2007) -to demonstrate that the two can be equivalent. Our findings are on the whole consistent with Weinstein and Shanks (2008) , and extend their findings to the more naturalistic context of visual scenes. Importantly, though, our analyses might reconcile Weinstein and Shanks' data with those of studies from the source monitoring literature, as we discuss shortly.
In both experiments, our perceptual identification task was highly effective at discriminating true recognition from pure associative false recognition: that is, false recognition of new items that were thematically related to the scene contexts. However, when thematicallyrelated items were presented to participants in word form during the false memory induction, subsequent identification latencies for the pictures became faster, and more similar to those for true recognition. Put differently, this shallow (largely lexical) processing of items made the indirect task a less useful method for distinguishing true from false recognition: In Experiment 1, there was no significant RT difference between these memories and true memories; in Experiment 2 there remained a significant difference, but this was small. FALSE RECOGNITION TESTED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY These findings seem to contradict Weinstein and Shanks' (2008) locations on a computer screen, and imagined others. The authors found that location information associated with viewed objects was misattributed at test to imagined objects that were perceptually similar (e.g., a cane and a crowbar, which are unrelated semantically but have a similar shape). The authors invoked a reactivation/misattribution process account to explain how imagined objects in their study acquired perceptual details (i.e., location information).
According to their explanation, when an imagined object is presented at test, it reactivates a set of perceptual features that actually belong to a perceptually-similar viewed object. The key feature (location) is then misattributed to the imagined object. In our study, a similar process may have occurred in the false memory induction phase. That is, when a previously unseen object was named in the vowel-counting phase, it may have activated perceptual features associated with similar objects that had appeared in the scenes. Perceptual details of these seen objects could then become associated with the unseen object names. In addition to this specific feature importation process involving studied objects, the imagination process could also result in participants importing perceptual features from outside the study context (Johnson et al., 1988 ). In the context of studies showing that imagination can result in false memories that are FALSE RECOGNITION TESTED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY rich in perceptual qualities, our data suggest that the ease of detecting false memories might depend on the extent to which they have been elaborated upon, with only minimal elaboration being necessary to make the discrimination task more difficult.
Two further points about our data are important to note. The first is that our results do not rule out the possibility of interdependence between recognition and priming. Participants could be using the ease of identification as a cue to recognition, thus increasing or even creating the relationship between the indirect and direct test. That is, participants may have an awareness (conscious or otherwise) that previously seen objects would be easier to identify than those they were seeing for the first time, so that a surprisingly fluent identification would increase the chance of making an "old" judgment on the recognition test. This possibility is supported by studies such as Johnston, Dark, and Jacoby (1985) that have linked fluency to recognition, and in fact this reliance on fluency is an inherent possibility in any recognition study, even one that does not include a separate object identification test. For this reason, we do not believe that the possibility of interdependence affects our claim that elaboration can lead to increased difficulty in distinguishing between true and false memories, as demonstrated by our two experiments.
The second point of note is that throughout this paper, we have assumed that the indirect task we used uniquely targets perceptual processes. The assumption is based on studies that used a verbal version of the task (Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983; Stark & McClelland, 2000) , and found a lack of cross-form priming. These prior findings led us to argue specifically that perceptual, and not conceptual, information is acquired by false memories in our procedure.
However this identification task has not been used with pictorial stimuli elsewhere, it is possible that this version of the task is also partially driven by conceptual processes. If this were the case, our results would fit with those of previous studies that showed cross-form conceptual (or FALSE RECOGNITION TESTED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY lexical) priming from object names to pictures (e.g., Durso & Johnson, 1979; Horner & Henson, 2011 ).
Our findings, in conjunction with the previous findings described above, have implications for attempts to distinguish true from false memories in behavioral and brainimaging studies. The general proposal that elaboration increases the similarity between true and false memories is consistent with data from brain-imaging studies such as Garoff-Eaton, Slotnick, and Schacter (2006) , who showed using fMRI that associative false memories had more neural commonalities with true memory than did non-associative, spontaneous false memories. In the present study, we did not have a 'control' condition measuring false recognition of new items that were unrelated to the visual scenes: including such a condition would likely have required us to use many times more scenes and critical items to find sufficient false alarms to these 'control' items. For this reason we have no comparison against which to contrast the RT data for the new but still thematically-related pictures. We are therefore unable to say whetheranalogously to the semantic associates in McDermott's (1997) study-the identification of falsely recognized 'new' items in these studies might too have been primed, albeit to a lesser extent than were falsely recognized 'read' items. Nevertheless, to our knowledge these studies provide the first evidence from an indirect task to show that shallow processing can increase the 'memory-like' properties of false memories. 
